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The Devil at Law in the Middle Ages
By the 12th century, the rise of legal science fostered canonists’ and 
theologians’ attempts to dei ne the mystery of divine justice using the 
rules of procedural law. During the last two centuries of the Middle 
Ages, this interest was rel ected in particular through the dissemination 
of trial stories (Processus Sathanae) opposing Mary to the devil over the 
salvation of men. The expression of Marian theology set in juristic terms 
also coni rmed the intrinsic value of Romano-canonical procedure as an 
institutional foundation of the authority of justice.
Le Diable et le droit au Moyen Âge
Dès le XIIe siècle, l’essor de la science juridique romano-canonique 
nourrit, chez les canonistes comme chez les théologiens, l’ambition 
de déi nir le mystère de la justice divine à partir des règles du droit 
processuel. Dans les deux derniers siècles du Moyen Âge, cet intérêt 
se traduit notamment par la diffusion de récits de procès (Processus 
Sathanae) opposant Marie et le diable sur le salut des hommes. Cette 
traduction de la théologie mariale en termes juridiques coni rme aussi la 
valeur intrinsèque de la procédure romano-canonique comme fondation 
institutionnelle de l’autorité de la justice.
“And the Lord said to the demon, ‘We have founded the laws, 
and we give to them their authority. The laws do not give authority 
to us.”1
I/ CANON LAW, HISTORY, AND THE LAST JUDGMENT
The propensity for medieval Christian theology to frame history 
in juridic terms is well known. The confession of faith issued as 
the i rst canon (c. Firmiter) of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 
offers sufi cient evidence. It afi rmed that at the end of the ages 
mankind will stand before an omnipotent God who “will judge the 
living and the dead and will render to each according to his works, 
the reprobate as well as the elect.”2 The Fourth Lateran Council 
did not invent this juridic framework for the Christian conception 
of history, but it emphasized it to such a degree that it became a 
matter of sustained interest for medieval canonists and theologians 
alike. The inclusion of the canon Firmiter at the beginning of the 
Liber Extra, promulgated by Gregory IX in 1234, only reinforced to 
medieval canonists that there was a seamless relationship between 
canon law and Christian eschatology.3
Although Firmiter was primarily a theological statement, its 
import for jurists was twofold. First, it used law to divide human 
history into discrete ages. As the glossa ordinaria to Firmiter 
elaborated, there are three historical ages, each governed by its 
own law: the time before law, in which men lived according to the 
ius naturale; the time under law, which began when God gave the 
Decalogue to Moses; and the time of grace, which began “when the 
1. Processus sathanae contra genus humanum, BnF Lat. 10770, fol. 95d. 
(14th C).
2. Fourth Lateran Council, c. 1. Constitutiones Concilii quarti Lateranensis 
una cum Commentariis glossatorum, ed. Antonio García y García (MIC, Series 
A: Corpus Glossatorum 2; Vatican City, 1981), 1-172. “… iudicaturus vivos et 
mortuos et redditurus singulis secundum opera sua, tam reprobis quam electis.”
3. X 1.1.1 (= 4 Lateran Council c. 1). All citations to the Decretum and the 
Liber Extra are from the edition of Emile Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici, 2 vols. 
(Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879; reprinted, Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 
1959) unless otherwise noted.
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Son of God taught us the gospels, under which we are ruled today.”4 
Second, Firmiter emphasized to medieval canonists that the present 
age would culminate in the last judgment, a legal process through 
which a gracious and just God would conclude human history.
That human history would culminate in a legal process was only 
to be expected. After all, a legal process marked the beginning of 
human history, which was initiated after Adam and Eve were judged 
and sentenced to exile from Paradise. In fact, canonists located the 
inception of their own discipline in that moment. According to 
Stephen of Tournai, who was borrowing directly from Paucapalea, 
when Adam was charged with disobedience by God and attempted 
to claim an “exceptio” by laying a criminal countercharge against 
Eve, he became a legal actor. “And thus litigating, or what we 
commonly call the form of pleading, appears to have arisen in 
Paradise.”5 By i nding the origins of their discipline in sacred 
history, canonists vested canon law with two foundational attributes. 
First, canonists could claim for canon law a historical priority that 
competed with theology in the rank of scientiae.6 Second, it could 
be claimed that canon law stood above the three historical ages of 
law, encompassing, according to Hostiensis, both “the new law and 
4. Gl. ord. ad X 1.1.1 iuxta ordinatissimam, “Hec fuit dispositio: quia tria 
tempora: tempus ante legem, et tempus sub lege, et tempus gratie. In tempore 
ante legem habebant homines ius naturale, quo regebantur, quod consistebat in his 
duobus preceptis contentis his versibus: Quod tibi vis i eri, mihi fac: quod non tibi, 
noli / Sic potes in terris vivere iure poli. Dist. 1 in principio. In tempore sub lege 
regebantur decalogo Moysi dato a Deo: et tunc contingebat omnia in i gura, que 
completa fuerunt tempore gratie, quondo Dei i lius nos docuit precepta evangelica, 
quibus hodie regimur.” Corpus juris canonici emendatum et notis illustratum, 
4 vols. (Rome: 1582), vol. 2, col. 9. See, for example, Knut Wolfgang Nörr, “Recht 
und Religion: über drei Schnittstellen im Recht der mittelalterlichen Kirche,” 79 
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (KA) 1-15 (1993).
5. Die Summa des Stephanus Tornacensis, ed. J.F. von Schulte (Giessen: 
Emil Roth, 1891), “Cum enim Adam de inobedientia argueretur a domino, quasi 
actioni exceptionem obiiciens relationem criminis in coniugem, immo in coniugis 
actorem convertit dicens; ‘Mulier, quam dedisti mihi sociam, ipsa me decepit 
et comedi.’ Sicque litigandi, vel, ut vulgariter dicamus, placitandi forma in ipso 
paradiso videtur exorta.” Cf. Paucapalea’s summa has been printed in Summa über 
des Decretum Gratiani, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth, 
1890), p. 1-2; See also Ken Pennington, “Law, Criminal Procedure,” Dictionary of 
the Middle Ages: Supplement 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons-Thompson-
Gale, 2004: 309-320.
6. See, for example, E. James Long, “Utrum iurista vel theologus plus 
proi ciat ad regimen ecclesiae: A Questio Disputata of Francis Caraccioli,” 
Mediaeval Studies (1968) 30: 134-62.
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the three ages of law.”7 As a result, just as canon law could claim 
a presence at the beginning of human history, it could also claim a 
presence at the last judgment, an event whose character as a process 
of law was not lost on canonists.
The afi rmation that Christ would “judge” the living and the 
dead at the end of the ages also elided an alternative possibility, 
contemplated but rejected by medieval theologians, in which the 
redemption of mankind from original sin and servitude to the 
devil might be accomplished through a simple exercise of divine 
power rather than judgment. The possibility that human salvation 
might harbor a contradiction between the justice and power of 
God had been recognized in the doctrines of the ancient Church. 
For example, St. Augustine had contemplated a tension between 
divine power and justice in his treatise De trinitate, but stressed 
that it “pleased God” to free man from the devil by justice rather 
than power.8 Nonetheless, insistence on the priority of divine 
justice over divine power preserved a tension with which medieval 
theologians continued to grapple. In the early twelfth century, the 
problem was posed in the following manner:
Did not the devil do an injury to God whose servant he i rst 
fraudulently deceived and afterward violently held? Therefore, what 
injustice would God commit if he wrested man from the hands of the 
unjust invader with only a word of his power?9
Although the anonymous author (long, but incorrectly, thought to 
be Hugh of Saint-Victor) seemed to be inviting the conclusion that 
nothing prevented God from exercising his power at the expense 
of his justice, he was deeply anxious to preserve the role of divine 
justice in the redemption of mankind from the power of the devil. 
The same text later offered an even sharper formulation of the 
7. Hostiensis, Summa Aurea, Proemium, num. 41 (Lyon: 1537).
8. De trinitate, Patrologia Latina (Hereafter PL), ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris) 
42: 1027 “Placuit Deo, ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate, non 
potentia diabolus, justicia vinceretur.”
9. PL 175: 617 Quaestiones in Epistolas Pauli, “Sed nonne diabolus injuriam 
Deo fecerat, qui servum prius fraudulenter decepit, et post violenter possedit ? 
Quam ergo iustitiam faceret Deus, si solo verbo potentiae suae eriperet hominem 
de manu injustissimi invasoris ?” Patrice Sicard has demonstrated that this text was 
not authored by Hugh of Saint-Victor. See Hugues de Saint-Victor et son école: 
introduction, choix de texte, traduction et commentaires (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991) 
pp. 273-277.
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problem: “This is the justice by which Christ vanquished the devil. 
The devil is a lover of power, and a forsaker of justice… Christ 
was unwilling to use power against a lover of power, but wanted 
to use justice against a forsaker of justice.” Thus, we should act in 
the same way toward our enemies so that “not by power, but rather 
through justice we will be victors.”10
This anonymous text echoed some of the central tenets of the 
ancient dogma known as the ransom theory of salvation, which 
credited the devil with obtaining a proprietary right in humankind 
at the moment of original sin.11 Hence, the emphasis placed on the 
justice of Christ stemmed in part from an anxiety that the devil 
possessed rights in humankind which would have been unjustly 
violated if Christ accomplished the liberation of mankind from the 
devil by an act of raw power. Such anxieties persisted despite the 
fact that Anselm of Canterbury, writing in the late eleventh century, 
is generally credited with negating the idea of the devil’s rights, 
at least as a theological matter. By denying that the devil had any 
rights, Anselm had relaxed the tension between the power and 
justice of God by collapsing the distinction between them. “In an evil 
angel there can be no justice at all. There was no reason, therefore, 
in respect to the devil, why God should not use his own power 
against him for the liberation of mankind.”12 Anselm’s solution 
was to show that in employing his power against the devil, God 
acted justly against one who did not deserve justice. But Anselm’s 
demonstration that the devil had no legal claim on humankind 
left intact the question as to whether the salvation of humankind 
was an expression of God’s justice or his power, and this question 
10. PL 175: 466, “Haec est justitia, qua Christus vicit diabolum. Diabolus 
amator potentiae, et desertor justitiae, Christum, in quo nihil dignum morte 
invenit, occidit… Noluit itaque contra amatorem potentiae uti potentia, sed contra 
desertorem justitiae voluit uti justitia, ut non informaret qualiter contra eumdem 
hostem nobis sit pugnandum; videlicet non potentia, sed potius justitia, et sic 
victores erimus.”
11. A succinct statement of this doctrine and its power is given in R.W. 
Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) pp. 207-211; criticism of Southern’s account of the 
reception of Anselm’s theory in medieval Christianity can be found in C.W. Marx, 
The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
12. Cur Deus Homo, 1.7. See, generally, Jaroslav Pelikan, The Growth of 
Medieval Theology: 600-1300, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
pp. 108-118.
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continued to trouble theologians in subsequent centuries. By the 
thirteenth century, however, the problem of divine justice was also 
increasingly a matter of concern for canonists. Examination of this 
question requires i rst assessing the disciplinary differences that 
had come to divide theologians and canonists in the late-medieval 
period before examining a fourteenth-century canon law manuscript 
which offers a unique approach to the problem of divine justice.
II/ TENSIONS BETWEEN CANONISTS AND THEOLOGIANS
If medieval canonists and theologians were ostensibly concerned 
with the same problem – namely, the nature and contours of God’s 
justice within the dogma of Christianity – they approached it from 
disciplinary perspectives that were increasingly antagonistic toward 
one another. Historians of medieval canon law have rightfully 
stressed its insularity and autonomy – tracing “a process of 
emancipation” from theology that was begun in the twelfth century 
and picked up momentum thereafter.13
Indeed, discord between canonists and theologians regarding 
their respective roles within the mystical body can be detected early 
on. In a famous passage of De consideratione, composed around 
1148, Bernard of Clairvaux asked his former student, the recently 
enthroned Pope Eugene III (1145-53):
Therefore, when do we pray? When do we teach the people? When 
do we edify the Church? When do we meditate on the Law? However, 
everyday in the [papal] palace they make such a noise of the laws, but 
of Justinian, not of the Lord.14
Bernard of Clairvaux’s remark highlighted the pious 
understanding of “Law” claimed by twelfth-century theologians 
13. The phrase is from G.H.M. Posthumus Myejes, “Exponents of Sovereignty: 
Canonists as Seen by Theologians in the Late Middle Ages,” in The Church and 
Sovereignty c.590-1918. Essays in Honour of Michael Wilks (Blackwell, Oxford, 
1991), at p. 302.
14. De consideratione 1.4 in Opera, eds. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome, 
1963), vol. 3, p. 399 [PL 182: 732-3] “Denique quando oramus ? quando docemus 
populos ? quando aedii camus Ecclesiam ? quando meditamur in lege ? Et quidem 
quotidie perstrepunt in palatio leges, sed Justiniani, non Domini… Nam certe lex 
Domini immaculata, convertens animas. Hae autem non tam leges, quam lites sunt 
et cavillationes, subvertentes judicium. Tu ergo pastor et episcopus animarum, qua 
mente, obsecro, sustines coram te semper silere illam, garrire istas ?”
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and denigrated the crass understanding of “laws” attributed to 
canon lawyers, whom Bernard thought corrupted the Church with 
the laws of ancient emperors. In Bernard’s view, the “Lex domini 
immaculata” had the capacity to convert souls, while the leges 
preoccupying canonists, which “are not so much laws as strife and 
scofi ng, subvert[ed] judgment.”15 Bernard marveled that the pope, 
“a pastor and bishop of souls,” could tolerate the lawyers and their 
accompanying litigious prattle that beset him daily.16 In the eyes of 
the theologians, the canonists’ preoccupation with litigiousness and 
the legislation of Roman emperors was inconsistent with meditation 
on divine justice.
The opprobrium theologians heaped upon canon law seems 
to have appeared simultaneously with the growth of the new 
universities, which, by the early thirteenth century, had dedicated 
faculties for the study of canon law.17 Indeed, the study of canon law 
thrived, emerging from a “proto-professional” period, which James 
Brundage has located between 1150 and 1190, into a full-blown 
profession in the thirteenth century.18 By the late twelfth century 
and thereafter canon law had reached a stage of development in 
which elite practitioners could dedicate their working lives to its 
practice and scholarship. Canon lawyers in this era typically earned 
university degrees in law, sometimes in both canon and civil law, 
and the successful ones could look forward to a relatively structured 
career path that included university study, a period of teaching, 
15. Id. The phrase “lex Domini immaculata” is a reference to Psalms 18:8.
16. Id. “Tu ergo, pastor et episcopus animarum, qua mente, obsecro, sustines 
coram tu semper silere illam, garrire istas ?”
17. Yves M.-J. Congar, “Un témoignage des désaccords entre canonistes et 
théologiens,” in Études d’histoire du droit canonique: dédiées à Gabriel le Bras, 
2 vols. (Paris, 1965) pp. 861-84; Joseph de Ghellinck, “Magister Vacarius; Un 
juriste théologien peu aimable pour les canonistes.” Revue d’histoire de l’Église de 
France (1943) 44: 173-78. Alan B. Cobban, “Theology and Law in the Medieval 
Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge”, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library of 
Manchester, 65 (1982), pp. 57-77; See D. N. Lepine, “The Origins and Careers of 
the Canons of Exeter Cathedral, 1300-1455,” in Religious Belief and Ecclesiastical 
Careers in Late Medieval England: The Proceedings of the Conference Held at 
Strawberry Hill, Easter, 1989, ed. C. Harper-Bill (Woodbridge, Suffolk, Boydell 
Press, 1991), pp. 87-120.
18. James Brundage, “The Rise of Professional Canonists and the Development 
of the Ius Commune,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (KA) 
(1995) 81: 26–63, at 31; Colin Morris, “From Synod to Consistory: The Bishops’ 
Courts in England, 1150-1250,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History (1971) 22: 
115-23.
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service as an advocate or counselor and, perhaps, an appointment in 
ecclesiastical administration.19
It is possible, of course, to exaggerate the differences between 
canonists and theologians. They still shared much in common. For 
example, Hostiensis, one of the most esteemed canonists of the 
thirteenth century and a cardinal, also wrote a short theological 
treatise on the Credo.20 Furthermore, theologians and canonists 
collaborated in the heresy controversies that emerged under 
the pontii cate of John XXII in the early fourteenth century.21 
Nonetheless, such involvement by canonists tended to antagonize 
the theologians.22 It did not help matters when Hostiensis (as reported 
by his critic, the theologian Pierre D’Ailly) claimed that:
Canon law indeed can be called the science of sciences. For if 
it is well understood, through it the temporal as well as the spiritual 
[realms] can be ruled.23
The theologians understood immediately that the descriptive 
“scientia scientiarum” was a purposeful elevation by Hostiensis 
of canon law above theology within the scholastic hierarchy of 
knowledge. Despite the hubris he displayed, Hostiensis could claim 
legal authority for his assertion. Justinian’s Digest had called jurists 
and judges “priests of justice” because they “worship justice and 
profess the knowledge of what is good and fair.”24 Medieval jurists 
(both Romanists and canonists) did not fail to elaborate on this 
association.25 For example, Accursius understood the priesthood 
of jurists to mean that those wanting to become lawyers did not 
19. Brundage, “The Rise of Professional Canonists,” 44-5.
20. Jean Longère, “L’enseignement du Credo: conciles, synodes et canonistes 
médiévaux jusqu’au xiiie siècle,” Sacris Erudiri (1991) 32: 309-341.
21. Alain Boureau, Satan hérétique. Naissance de la démonologie dans 
l’Occident médiéval (1280-1330) (Paris, Odile Jacob, 2004).
22. I elaborate on these issues in an article dedicated to my colleague William 
J. Courtenay. See Karl Shoemaker, “When the Devil Went to Law School” in 
Crossing Boundaries, ed. Spencer Young (New York: Brill, forthcoming 2011).
23. D’Ailly, Utrum indoctus in iure divino possit iusta praeesse in Gersoni 
Opera Omnia, 5 vols. (Antwerp, 1706) 5: 655 a-b. “Haec scientia vere potest 
scientia scientiarum nuncupari. Nam si bene intelligatur, per eam tam temporalia 
quam spiritualia regi possunt.” D’Ailly appears to have been paraphrasing some 
remarks of Hostiensis in the Proemium to his Summa Aurea.
24. D. 1.1.1. See also Ulrich von Lübtow, “De iustitia et iure,” Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (RA) (1948) 66: 458-465.
25. Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political 
Theology (Princeton University Press, 1957), 120-1.
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need to study theology, because theology is already found within 
the law.26 The tractatus de legibus in Gratian’s Decretum had also 
taught canon lawyers that their discipline required knowledge of 
human laws and divine law, and invited the inference, contested 
strenuously by theologians like Ockham, that mastery of canon law 
encompassed mastery of theology as well.27
For medieval canonists, the distance between the claim that they 
had special province in matters concerning the governance of this 
world as well as matters governing entry into the next world was 
not all that great. When the Fourth Lateran Council asserted that 
Christ would “render to each according to his works,” the canonists 
surely heard an echo of Ulpian’s famous dei nition of justice as 
the “constant and perpetual will to render to each according to 
his right.”28 The centrality of divine justice in the economy of 
salvation also raised other associations for medieval canonists, who 
would have taken to heart the juridical implications of the Pauline 
language of salvation as a “justii cation.”29 From this perspective, 
the pretensions of the canonists begin to take a different shape. 
Canon law, they could claim, was not merely the specialized, but 
subservient, knowledge necessary for ordering the processes by 
which the Church was administered on earth. It also entailed the 
knowledge of justitia, understood both as an attribute of divinity 
and as “the state of man ‘justii ed’ before God.”30
But of course divine justice is not limited to humankind. Satan and 
his demons are its objects as well. It may have been considerations 
such as these that lay behind William Durantis’ quip that even the 
devil would receive legal process if he asked for his case to be 
26. Glossa ordinaria ad Dig. 1.1.10 “Sed numquid secundum hoc oportet 
quod quicumque vult iurisprudens vel iurisconsultus esse, debeat theologiam 
legere ? Respondeo, non; nam omnia in corpore iuris inveniuntur.”
27. Decretum, D. 21, c. 1. “Nam maiorum haec erat consuetudo, ut rex esset 
etiam sacerdos et pontifex. Unde et Romani Imperatores pontii ces dicebantur.” 
This was a passage that the civilian jurists, such as Azo, did not overlook. See 
Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, p. 125 ff.
28. Dig. 1.1.10.
29. See, above all, Stephan Kuttner, “A Forgotten Dei nition of Justice,” 
Mélanges Gérard Fransen (Studia Gratiana 20; Rome, 1976) 76-110, reprinted 
in Kuttner, The History of Ideas and Doctrines of Canon Law in the Middle Ages 
(London, 1980) 75-109.
30. Id. at 78.
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heard.31 It may also have been these considerations that prompted 
late-medieval canonists to pay considerable attention to the devil 
and his relationship to justice. In the preface to his Summa, Rui nus 
explicitly cast the devil as an enemy of humankind and justice:
The dignity of the human creature before sin emanated from these 
two things, as if suspended from cords, namely, the rectitude of justice 
and the clarity of knowledge. By the former it presided over human 
matters and through the latter it drew near to heavenly matters. But 
as the envy of the devil increased, the rectitude of justice was pushed 
down by the weight of perverted malice and the light of knowledge 
was obscured by the gloom of error.32
Fourteenth-century canonists continued to display a keen 
interest in the devil, typically focusing on his role as an accuser 
of mankind. The ordinary gloss to the Liber Extra noted the 
prosecutorial character of the devil, and offered the following 
creative etymology:
The devil is called “incriminator” and it is a Greek word. It is derived 
from “dia,” that is, “two,” and “bolus,” that is “a little morsel,” because 
he seeks to make two little morsels of the body and the soul.33
Albericus de Rosate’s fourteenth-century legal dictionary 
contained several entries under diabolus as well as daemones, 
entries which stressed not only the accusatory role of the fallen 
angels, but also their insightful understanding of human nature 
and human laws.34 The glossators also took notice of demonology. 
In his gloss on the Liber Extra, Johannes Andreae included a 
fanciful explanation that the word “daemones” was formed from 
31. Speculum iuris (Basel: 1574) de inquisitione (p. 42): “et etiam diabolo, 
si in iudicio adesset, non negaretur.” See also, Ken Pennington “Due Process, 
Community, and the Prince in the Evolution of the Ordo iudiciarius,” Revista 
internazionale di diritto comune (1998) 9:9-47.
32. Die Summa Magistri Rui ni, ed. F. von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth, 
1892), p. 2. See also Robert Sommerville and Bruce Brasington, Prefaces to 
Canon Law in Latin Christianity: Selected Translation, 500-1245 (New Haven: 
Yale University, 1998), p. 191.
33. “Diabolus: Dicitur criminator, et est graecum vocabulum, derivatur autem 
a dia, quod est duo, et bolus, quod est morsellus, quia duos bolos tantum de corpore 
et anima quaerit facere.” Corpus juris canonici emendatum et notis illustratum, 
4 vols. (Rome: 1582), vol. 2, col. 8.
34. Albericus de Rosate, Dictionarium iuris tam civilis, quam canonici 
(Venice 1573). Most of the pertinent entries were distillations of the attributes of 
demons that Thomas Aquinas had given in his De demonibus (Rome, 1982) 23: 
279-334.
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“deorsum,” since demons have a will to do what their name says, 
“to cast down.”35 Despite their destructive power, and their intimate 
knowledge of law, the devil and his demons were fundamentally 
characterized by their lack of faith.36 This lack of faith, taught 
canon law, rendered demons unable to properly understand law and 
justice. On this point, the theologians and the canonists were in fact 
not very far apart. Still, it would be within the province of canon 
law that the question of the justice due to the devil was cast in the 
form of a lawsuit between Mary and the devil.
III/ THE PROCESSUS SATHANAE
It may be that the close attention that fourteenth-century canonists 
paid to the devil and his demons was a result of the generally 
increased interest in demonology that historians have noted 
emerging at the end of the thirteenth century. As Alain Boureau 
has recently argued, a juridii cation of demonology appears to have 
occurred during the papacy of John XXII, generating specialized 
interest in demons among theologians and canonists alike.37
A fascinating consequence of this juridical interest in the 
legal standing of the devil was the production of an anonymous 
manuscript tradition, sometimes known under the rubric Processus 
Sathanae, that emerged in the i rst third of the fourteenth century. 
The Processus Sathanae was simultaneously an account of human 
salvation told from within the framework of Roman-canon law and 
a demonstration of how the devil’s lack of faith was fatal to his 
ability to fully understand the justice he so strenuously sought.
The premise of the Processus Sathanae was that the devil and 
his hellish council selected a demon learned in the law and sent 
him to the court of heaven in order to sue for a legal title to the 
human race. The Virgin Mary, who eventually served as the legal 
35. Johannes Andreae, In Quinque Decretalium Libros Novella Commentaria 
(Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1963), fol. 9, “daemon vel deorsum l uens, vel 
ruens, ut quod habet in voluntate, ferat in nomine: nonnullus qui decidit, sursum 
ascendere monet: sed deorsum ruere suadet, unde Matt. 4, ‘si i lius Dei es, mitte 
te deorsum.’”
36. Johannes Andreae, In Quinque Decretalium Libros Novella Commentaria 
(Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1963), fol. 6.
37. Alain Boureau, Satan hérétique, op. cit.
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representative for the human race in the suit, and the demon, who 
served as Hell’s advocate, engaged in sophisticated and detailed 
legal arguments over the ultimate fate of humanity. Both advocates 
relied heavily on Roman and canon law authorities, though at 
certain points the Bible was also cited. Christ served as judge in 
the case.
Scholars have long recognized that the basic narrative structure of 
the lawsuit was lifted directly from the Maskeroen chapter of Jacob 
van Maerlant’s late thirteenth-century Dutch text Boek van Merline 
(c. 1260), which in turn had borrowed liberally from Robert de 
Boron’s slightly earlier Merlin.38 In these texts, which belonged to 
the Arthurian literary tradition, the devil’s lawsuit was presented as 
Hell’s response to the harrowing accomplished by Christ after his 
crucii xion and before his resurrection, in which the Old Testament 
elect were forcibly liberated from captivity in Hell. Van Maerlant’s 
text circulated widely, and was even translated into other vernacular 
languages.39 At some point early in the fourteenth century, however, 
an unknown person rendered van Maerlant’s text into Latin, set it 
within the procedural framework required by Roman-canon law, 
and supplied the various legal and theological assertions within the 
text with citations of relevant legal authorities. The citations inserted 
into the trial narrative are of uneven reliability, and may have been 
part of student exercises at Bologna.40 Copies of the lawsuit also 
circulated widely, identii able in at least two distinct manuscript 
38. See J.P. Wickersham Crawford, “The Catalon Mascaron and an Episode in 
Jacob van Maerlant’s Merlijn,” Publications of the Modern Language Association 
(1911) 26: 31-50; Merlin: A Case Book, eds. Peter Goodrich and Raymond H. 
Thompson (Routledge, 2003), pp. 1-104; Jacob von Maerlant, Historie van den 
Grale und Boek van Merline, ed. Timothy Sodmann (1980).
39. Willem Gerritsen, “Jacob Van Maerlant and Geoffrey of Monmouth,” in 
An Arthurian Tapestry: Essays in Memory of Lewis Thorpe (Glasgow, 1981) 368-
388. Representations of Mary or Christ engaged in a dispute or lawsuit with the 
devil were immensely popular, and many vernacular versions appeared in the late 
Middle Ages. See, e.g., Frederick Roediger, Contrasti Antichi: Christo e Satana 
(Florence, 1887); L’Advocacie Notre-Dame, ou La Vierge Marie plaidant contre 
le diable (Paris, 1855); “Mascarón” in Colección de Documentos inéditos del 
Archivo general de la Corona de Aragón, eds. D. Próspero de Bofarull y Mascaró, 
vol. 13. (1853).
40. Biblioteca di Collegio di Spagna, ms. 126, fol. 189r-195r. This manuscript 
shows clear evidence of the insertion of citations (allegationes) into the text of the 
lawsuit.
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recensions, and were printed several times in the late-i fteenth and 
early-sixteenth centuries.
Surprisingly, only scant legal-historical attention has been paid 
to this record of the devil’s litigiousness. The text is not altogether 
unknown to scholars, but it has not been closely studied. Earlier 
generations of legal historians, including such luminaries as 
Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Sir Paul Vinogradoff 
(1854-1925), mentioned various versions of the lawsuit between 
Mary and the devil in their surveys of medieval legal literature, 
but dismissed them as curiosities. Savigny found the depiction 
of sacred subjects frivolous, bordering on sacrilege; Vinogradoff 
simply found the text “curious.”41 J. Neville Figgis considered the 
text a “jeu d’esprit,” but was rather dismissive of it.42 Even scholars 
who refused to dismiss the text as a mere bad joke or sacrilege 
asserted that it belonged more properly to the antiquarian study of 
the “dogmatic tradition of the ancient Church” rather than to the 
study of medieval canon law or theology proper.43 The unlikely 
possibility that Bartolus, the great fourteenth-century jurist, had 
actually composed one version of the devil’s lawsuit prompted 
occasional but unsustained interest from legal historians.44 On 
41. Friedrich Von Savigny, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts im Mittelalter. 
Bd. 6. Das vierzehnte und fünfzehnte Jahrhundert. (Heidelberg, 1831), p. 160. 
“Der Rechstreit zwischen der Jungfrau Maria und Teufel betrifft das Heil des 
Menschengeschlechts, und soll dazu dienen, den ganzen Gang des Prozesses an 
einem erdichteten Beyspiel anschaulich zu machen. In der That aber erscheint diese 
Arbeit, den Frevel an heiligen Gegenständen ungerechnet, als ein pedantischer, 
breit durchgeführter Spass.” Paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe 
(2nd ed, Oxford, 1929) p. 129-30, though he appears to have confused the Processus 
Sathanae and the slightly later Belial tradition. On the Belial tradition, see Norbert 
Ott, Rechtspraxis und Heilsgeschichte: zu Überieferung, Ikonographie, und 
Gebrauchssituation des deutschen Belial (Munich, 1983).
42. J. Neville Figgis, “Bartolus and the Development of European Political 
Ideas,” in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New Series, Vol. 19, 
(1905), pp. 147-168, at p. 164.
43. Roderich Stintzing, Geschichte der populären Literatur des römisch-
kanonischen Rechts in Deutschland am Ende des fünfzehnten und im Anfang des 
sechszehnten Jahrhunderts, (Leipzig, 1867).
44. The difi culties with attributing the text to Bartolus are shown in 
Carmen Cardelle de Hartmann, “Satan vor Gericht: Die Processus Satanae als 
Inszenierung juristischer Rhetorik,” in Die antike Rhetorik in der europäischen 
Geistesgeschichte, eds. Wolfgang Kol er and Karlheinz Töchterle (Wien: 2002). De 
Hartmann gives a description of the various manuscripts which follows Stintzing 
(see note above). For the view that Bartolus authored the Processus Sathanae, 
see Robert Jacquin, “Le Procès de Satan,” in Bartolo da Sassoferato: Studi e 
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balance, however, the Processus Sathanae has received surprisingly 
little scholarly attention.
We i rst meet the demonic procurator as he approached the 
heavenly throne and exclaimed: “I am a damned procurator for 
iniquitous Hell appearing before you in order to bring an action 
against humankind.”45 Christ responded in an unwelcoming manner: 
“We are not willing to be informed by you, for we recall how while 
we were walking on the earth you wished to inform us. You said, 
‘speak, so that these stones become bread’ and you said you would 
give us riches if we worshipped you.”46 But the demon insisted, 
making it explicit that he expected his lawsuit to be heard. “You are 
justice and truth. I am seeking justice, petitioning that humankind 
be called before you on a certain day in order to respond to me, 
the procurator of iniquitous Hell.”47 The demon then presented his 
procuratorium, which validated his right to speak on behalf of Hell, 
noting, “without this I should not be admitted.”48 After inspecting 
the writ and i nding it free of calumny, Christ permitted the demon to 
proceed. The demon began by requesting a day to be assigned upon 
documenti per VI centenario, (2 vols.) (Milan, 1962); Jacquin’s view appears to be 
partially adopted by Scott L. Taylor in “Reason, Rhetoric, and Redemption: The 
Teaching of Law and the Planctus Mariae in the Late Middle Ages,” in Medieval 
Education, eds. Ronald B. Begley and Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. (Fordham, 2005) 
68-81. Nonetheless, perhaps because a version of the Processus Sathanae appears 
in a Bolognese manuscript that contains a number of Bartolus’ texts (as well as 
some consilia of Baldus de Ubaldis), the association was an easy one for early 
printers to make.
45. For all that follows, I rely on the manuscript BnF lat. 10770 (f. 189v-195v) 
(c. 1360). Other copies of the manuscripts are BnF lat. 18216, Vatican Ross. 
lat. 1124 (129r-135r), as well as those catalogued by de Hartmann in “Satan vor 
Gericht: Die Processus Satanae als Inszenierung juristischer Rhetorik,” in Die 
antike Rhetorik in der europäischen Geistesgeschichte, eds. Wolfgang Kol er and 
Karlheinz Töchterle (Wien: 2002) and Ina Friedlaender, “Processus Satanae Contra 
Genus Humanum: Ein Förbisedd Litterär Text I En Formulärbok Från Vadstena 
Kloster,” Archivistica et Mediaevistica Ernesto Nygren Oblata (Stockholm, 1956), 
pp. 123-157. A printed edition of the text, dubiously attributed to Bartolus, is the 
Tractatus Iudiciorum: Processus Sathanae contra genus humanum (Johan Petit, 
Paris, 1510).
I am currently at work on a monograph that examines the historical, legal and 
theological contexts of the text, as well as editions of the text in its two prominent 
variations.
46. Fol. 189v. Christ is making references to the temptation he suffered at the 
hands of the devil in the desert.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
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which humankind should appear and asked that humankind appear 
“tomorrow.” To this, Christ replied, “You know from experience 
that the way [here] is long. We are not in agreement, and thus the 
judge is to assign the day. Thus, we assign you a day, namely Good 
Friday, the day I hung upon the cross and died.”49
Anticipating that this did not bode favorably for the outcome of 
his case, the demon objected, saying “Lord, everywhere this day is 
celebrated.”50 Arguing that even the divine law forbade assigning 
a court day on a holy day, the demon claimed that no binding 
judgment could be issued on Good Friday. Christ answered thus, 
“We have founded the laws and we give to them authority. They do 
not give authority to us.”51
Medieval jurists would have recognized the political resonance 
of this statement, for it held implications for both royal and papal 
politics. For example, Bracton, the most well-known commentator 
on English common law in the thirteenth century, read the 
cosmic conl ict between Christ and the devil as an argument for 
the submission of earthly kings to earthly law.52 And as William 
Courtenay has shown, some canon lawyers even transplanted 
the theological language of divine power (potentia absoluta and 
potentia ordinata) to the realm of papal power and attributed to the 
pope the power to act outside the process of law.53 In fact, some 
canonists held the view that the pope, like God, was only bound 
by the law by his own benevolence, not necessity.54 Hostiensis, for 
example, argued that the pope could suspend the ordinary operation 
of the law on account of ratio status ecclesiae. Whether or not 
canonists thought that the pope could claim this divine power (and 
some thought he could), Christ as judge was asserting an unqualii ed 
power to circumvent the rules of legal process. The problem of the 
relationship between divine justice and divine power had been 




52. See Bracton, De legibus f. 5b, 2:33; and the discussion by Kantorowicz, 
The King’s Two Bodies, p. 156.
53. William J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition (1990), p. 93-94.
54. Hostiensis, Lectura in quinque decretalium Gregorianarum libros, ad 
5.31.8 (Venice, 1581).
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Hence, Good Friday was designated as the day for humankind to 
appear and the lawsuit to proceed, and the Archangel Gabriel was 
commanded to summon humankind.
On the appointed day, the demon returned to the court of heaven 
and waited impatiently to be heard. No one appeared on behalf of 
humankind and the demon eagerly requested letters establishing the 
failure of humankind to appear. Christ refused the request of the 
demon, instead ruling that humankind should be given an extra day 
to appear. This caused the demon to exclaim, “Where is justice? I 
do not i nd it in heaven!”55
At this point, we learn that the Virgin Mary had been following all 
these events and was resolved to serve as an advocate on behalf of 
humankind.56 Realizing that Mary intended to serve as an advocate 
for humankind, the demon cried out, “Holy Father, let not l esh and 
blood move you!”57 The demon then made two objections in law. 
First, he explained, Mary cannot be an advocate because she is a 
woman. Second, she is the mother of the judge.58
The Virgin Mary was ready with a response. Although it is true 
that “women generally are not admitted to the ofi ce of advocate,” 
she explained, women are permitted to serve as advocates for 
orphans, widows, and miserable persons. Since many such persons 
would be returned to servitude in hell if no one spoke on behalf 
of humankind, she should be allowed to stand as an advocate 
notwithstanding the fact that she was a woman. Moreover, Mary 
explained, if she were an excommunicant, she would be able to 
act as advocate for herself. And although she was the mother of 
the judge, she was also a member of humankind and thus named 
defendant in the lawsuit. In fact, not only did Mary belong to 
humankind, she was simultaneously a member of all three orders of 
women: married, chaste, and a virgin. As such, she had the right to 
serve as an advocate despite her sex and her relation to the judge.
Displeased, the demon had no choice but to proceed. Initially, 
the demon cast the case as one of spoliation. Hell and its demons 
had been in “peaceful possession” of humankind for thousands 





 THE DEVIL AT LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 583
unjustly dispossessed. Therefore, the demon demanded immediate 
and full restitution.59 Mary replied, however, that no claim to unjust 
spoliation could be made by one who had come into possession of a 
thing by fraud. Since Hell only had gained possession of humankind 
through the lies of the devil in the Garden of Eden, it could not claim 
rightful possession now. On this point, Christ sided with Mary and 
denied to the demon his claim for restitution.
Undaunted, the demon changed tactics. Abandoning his claim for 
restitution, he strode forward, presented the Bible, and began to read 
from Genesis concerning Adam’s disobedience in the garden. The 
demon argued that the violation of divine command accomplished 
by Adam and Eve was imputable to the entire human race. To 
this, Mary countered by claiming that Adam and Eve sinned at the 
urging of the serpent by whom Eve was deceived into disobeying 
God. As a party complicit in the crime, argued Mary, Hell could 
not now bring an accusation against another for the same crime. 
But the procurator had a response ready. Relying on the logic of 
the inquisitorial procedures that canonists had developed in the 
early thirteenth century, the demon explained that when a delictum 
is perpetrated notoriously, a judge should proceed and punish it 
even if there is no accuser. Hence, the obligation to proceed against 
humankind fell to Christ as judge, regardless of whether the devil 
was complicit in original sin (and therefore unable to bring an 
accusation) or not.
This argument struck a cord with Mary. Her response was 
dramatic. Fearing that the judge would i nd against humankind, 
Mary stopped relying on citations to Roman-canon law. Instead, 
following “the fragility of the womanly sex,” Mary “exploded into 
tears, knelt, and cut her vestments open at the breast.”60 Addressing 
her son, she sobbed “My blessed son, there is the one who rejected 
you, stoned you, had you tied to a column, and hung on a cross like 
a thief. He implores your noble ofi ce. I am your most dear mother 
that carried you for nine months and piously nourished you with milk 
from these breasts.” If you i nd for the demon, she wept, “delete me 





reduced to a weeping woman, was a prime reason modern scholars 
dismissed the text. Indeed, how could one not agree with the demon 
when he remarked to Christ, “I say to you that l esh and blood, not 
celestial justice, have been revealed by the Son.”62
From the perspective of medieval canonists and theologians, 
the demon’s remark betrayed ignorance of an important attribute 
of Mary’s tears. For both theology and canon law placed heavy 
stress on the spiritual efi cacy of tears. Tears were not merely 
an attribute of the body in the medieval period; they were also a 
profound and necessary medium for intercession, spiritual renewal, 
and justii cation.63
But there appears to be more to Mary’s action than mere tears. 
In a curious bit of testimony given at the canonization process of 
Yves Hélory in Brittany in the 1330s, we i nd the following. A 
certain young man (also named Yves) was freed from demonic 
possession by the saint. The young man’s demonic possession had 
i rst occurred when his mother cursed him by “falling to her knees 
and extracting her breasts from her garment, saying: ‘I give to you 
my curse with these breasts which you sucked and my womb in 
which I carried you and by whatever rights [juris] I have in you 
and am able to have in you . . . all of it I give over and concede to 
the devil.”64 The mother’s curse contains a nearly exact replication 
of the gestures attributed to Mary in the Processus Sathanae, but 
here the scene is inverted. Rather then asking to be deleted from 
the book of life, Yves’ mother explicitly cedes her rights, as jura, 
to the devil. The invocation and exposure of nursing breasts and 
a carrying womb remains the same, suggesting something of an 
archetype for pleading or cursing. It is a gesture of possession and 
dispossession, and as such it is an act of transfering, or threatening 
to transfer, rights. Whereas the mother of Yves dispossessed him 
62. Fol. 193v.
63. On the theological aspects of tears in the middle ages, see Piroska Nagy, 
Le don des larmes au Moyen Âge (Paris, 2000); on the legal aspects, see William 
J. Courtenay and Karl B. Shoemaker, “The Tears of Nicholas: Simony and Perjury 
by a Parisian Master of Theology in the Fourteenth Century”, Speculum (2008) 
83: 603-628.
64. Monuments originaux de l’histoire de Saint Yves, eds. A. de la Borderie, 
J. Daniel, R.P. Perquis, and D. Tempier (Saint Brieuc: L. Prud’homme, 1887), 
p. 419-420. This scene is discussed in Alain Boureau, Satan hérétique, op. cit., 
chapter 5.
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and abandoned him to the devil, Mary restated her belonging to 
humankind, willing even to join us in eternal damnation should 
the devil prevail. Whereas the mother of Yves willingly gave up 
her rights, Mary recalled her son to the maternal relationship that 
bound them. Whereas the mother of Yves gave up her rights in 
anger and despair, Mary claimed her rights in Christian faith. More 
than simply the tearful expression of an overwrought woman, 
Mary’s gesture in the trial was deeply bound up in fourteenth-
century understandings of the rights of motherhood. In this way, 
Mary’s plea was not extralegal.
Mary’s plea was effective. Moved by her pious tears, Christ 
denied the petition of the demon and refused to hear criminal 
charges against humankind. As a formal matter, the trial was still 
not over, though it is clear that everything from this point onward 
had tipped in Mary’s favor. The demon insisted on a distribution 
of souls between Mary and Hell. He was willing to allow her to 
take the good souls and to content himself with the bad souls. It 
was a division the demon anticipated would be benei cial to Hell. 
But Mary was ever vigilant, and reminded Christ in explicitly 
theological terms that he had already suffered punishment on 
behalf of humankind. What the demon sought was already a res 
judicata. There was nothing to litigate. The demon was expelled 
from the heavenly court, and Mary was showered with praise from 
the choir of angels.
It is clear that the Processus Sathanae is an expression of Marian 
theology, set in juridic terms. But it is also an account of human 
salvation framed by the processes of fourteenth-century Roman-
canon law. The Processus Sathanae insisted that the theology of 
Christian redemption could be coherently presented through the 
processes of canon law, and that the devil’s one-sided understanding 
of law was the result of an engagement with law that was blind to its 
spiritual content and purpose. The Processus Sathanae addressed 
human salvation in a manner that also implicated the relationship 
between Christ (and his vicar on earth, the pope) and the law, 
framing the matter within the theological and jurisprudential issues 
of the late medieval world. At bottom, it all depended on a world of 
seamless intelligibility that linked spiritual truth and legal processes, 
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whether human or divine. It also depended on a world that was 
granted reason and historical purpose by a presumed loving deity 
susceptible to being moved by tears and capable of dissolving 
rules of law in favor of a higher justice, one which resulted in the 
salvation of humankind. Whatever squabbles divided canonists and 
theologians, the devil’s lawsuit provided a medium by which the 
troublesome relationship between divine justice and divine power 
was given one explanation in the fourteenth century.
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